Okay Lacan’s formula “desire is the desire of the Other” does not mean
“Firstly, desire is essentially a desire for recognition from this ‘Other’; secondly desire is for the thing that we suppose the Other desires, which is to say, the thing that the Other lacks.”
It means that the capacity to desire is solicited, or rather demanded from us, and the originary signal of this demand is the irruption of the imaginary which opens up into and fractures the real.
The “desire for recognition” from the Other mentioned above is an injunction to be seen desiring. I essentially reject the Kojevian “recognition” narrative here. From this perspective, the second elaboration, i.e. what “we suppose the Other
desires”
amounts to the same thing; the Other isn’t lacking some arbitrary object, rather it is lacking desire itself. This assertion ought to be taken as profoundly ontological. However, the injunction to be seen desiring will not immediately nor dialectically give rise to desires as such, since it is not actually represented as desire but signaled as a demand.
The position of the big Other at this stage of its imminent deployment is not as an emissary of the “signal” which forges a connection to the imaginary. A signal in this sense does not require a sender, only a recipient. If the real can be given primacy, and the Other remains ontologically consistent with this real, then the genesis of the Other must be the real emergence of a traumatic confrontation with physical spatiality which cannot be structurally situated or presupposed.
This is essentially to say that the solicitation of the imaginary order is a spontaneous, non-dialectical emergence of a perceptible bodily fragment. This bodily fragment in turn has the potential to become a perceptual basis for differentiation against the backdrop of the imaginary and the real. In order for desire to fully emerge however, this bodily fragment needs to be “passed around” if you will. This is sufficient to provide the partial-object which slowly assembles our subjectivation. There is no “subject” at this stage, but its presumable development can be designated as the imaginary phallus i(a) while still remaining consistent with an ontology of sense.







